Reference Material:
Freedom
and Belief by Galen Strawson (2010)
I’m
now taking That Doesn’t Follow into perhaps over-charted philosophical
territory, but important territory nonetheless – the issue of free will. The
debate surrounding free will is ancient, endless, and dizzying. It stretches all
the way back to Plato and Aristotle, and everyone of major and minor import
since, it seems, has had something to say on the subject. Figures with opposing
views tend to talk past each other, often claiming their counterpart’s
arguments simply miss the point. Consensus on the definitions of key terms is
rare. Indeed, the debate is often dominated or wholly consumed by such
definitional disagreements. To an interested outsider, engagement can be difficult.
So
it’s hard to know where to start. I don’t want to, nor am I capable of,
detailing the entire philosophical landscape, with all its arguments,
counterarguments, intricacies, and nuance. There are some good introductions to
the debate out there already (as usual, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
is the standard). My plan is a series of essays with the following basic
structure:
- Some limited attempts at definitions, to the extent that this is possible, to offer an idea of what free will might mean.
- A sketch of some basic arguments, with a commentary on where my intuitions place me in the philosophical landscape.
- An exploration of some very intriguing analyses due to Galen Strawson, which seem to cut through parts of, or perhaps chart a new course for, the debate.
- Revisiting previous definitions, arguments, etc., based on new reading or ideas.
This post will attempt to tackle the first
step, definitions. First, a deep breath…
What
is free will? What does it mean to say a person has free will, or is free? I’ll
define three main conceptions, or families of conceptions, of freedom: the
to-do-otherwise sense, the sourcehood sense, and the moral responsibility sense.
These different conceptions aren’t necessarily logically distinct from one
another (one may blend into another under the philosophical microscope), but
they could be, so they deserve delineation at least initially.
The freedom to do
otherwise can be stated in two general forms. The conditional form is something
like the following: you are free to do otherwise if, were you to choose to do
otherwise, you would in fact do otherwise. One might shift the language from
that of action/choice to that of choice/desire: you are free to choose
otherwise if, were you to desire to choose otherwise, you would in fact choose
otherwise (the distinctions between action, choice, and desire will come up later
in the discussion). The freedom to do otherwise might also be expressed in a
so-called categorical form: you are free to do or choose otherwise at some time
if it is possible, holding everything fixed up until that time, for you to do
or choose otherwise. The conditional and categorical forms superficially sound
quite similar, but they are different in important respects.
Sourcehood
accounts of freedom are harder to articulate so concisely. Some versions cite
reasons-responsiveness as the requisite condition for an agent to be the source
of their action. According to this conception, an agent is free if they (and
their choice or action) are responsive to reasons in some sense. The meat of
this account is in fleshing out just what “responsive to reasons” means in this
context. A different kind of sourcehood account employs self-determination as
the key concept. An agent can be considered free if they (and their choice or
action) are self-determined somehow. Again, the success of such an account
hangs on a convincing description of what exactly “self-determined” means.
Freedom
defined as moral responsibility is just that. An agent is free if they possess
whatever property, ability, etc. justifies holding them morally responsible for
their actions or choices. This conception is simple as stated, but it’s
basically shifting the definitional burden from the concept of free will to the
concept of moral responsibility. This account owes us an accompanying description
of what is entailed by moral responsibility.
When
I claim to have free will, what exactly am I claiming to possess? Freedom in
the to-do-otherwise sense? The conditional or categorical version? Perhaps I am
claiming I am the source of my own choices or actions. Does this involve
responsiveness to reasons, self-determination, or something else? Or maybe I
just mean I can be held morally responsible for my actions. As I mentioned
earlier, these definitional questions form an important part of the
philosophical free will debate. I’ll sketch my take on them in the next post.
A
closing note – the concept of determinism plays a prominent role in the free
will debate. As I encounter it, my treatment will lean on my previous
discussions (posts 1, 2, and 3).
